Da General Motors gik konkurs.

søndag den 19. december 2021

General Motors blev engang betragtet som verdens bedst ledede og mest succesfulde firma. Men mellem 1980 og 2009 faldt GM's markedsandel i USA fra 46 til 20 procent, og i 2009 gik firmaet konkurs.

Hvordan skete det ?

Denne amerikanske udgivelse fra 2014 argumenterer for, at den konventionelle forklaring er ufuldstændig, og at GM kollapsede af mange af de samme grunde, som mange andre succesrige amerikanske firmaer fra 1960'erne blev tvunget ud af markedet.

Herunder en manglende forståelse for evner til at konkurrere samt en manglende evne til effektivt at reagere, når de så endelig konkurrerede.

I udgivelsen diskuteres der en række mulige årsager til GM's udfordringer. Der antydes bla., at fra GM's erfaringer kan det bidrage til vigtige antydelser I vores forståelse af ledelsens rolle i den moderne, videnbaserede virksomhed.

Da jeg læste følgende kunne jeg ikke lade være med at tænke på, hvordan nogle virksomheder forsøger at "plastre" et organisatorisk rammeværk på deres egen organisation. Som om du blot kan kopiere et design fra en succesfuld organisation og tro det afføder success på samme måde.

"Even after managers at General Motors became convinced that Toyota was indeed ven after managers at General Motors became convinced that Toyota wasindeed doing “something different” in its factories—a development many industry observers oing “something different” in its factories—a development many industry observers credit to the appointment of Roger Smith as GM’s chief executive offi redit to the appointment of Roger Smith as GM’s chief executive offi cer in 1981— cer in 1981— they appeared to have believed that the essence of Toyota’s advantage lay in tools like hey appeared to have believed that the essence of Toyota’s advantage lay in tools like the fi xtures designed to change stamping dies rapidly, or in the use of “just in time” xtures designed to change stamping dies rapidly, or in the use of “just in time” inventory systems, rather than in the management practices that made it possible nventory systems, rather than in the management practices that made it possible to develop and deploy these techniques. For example, Jeffrey Liker, a professor and o develop and deploy these techniques. For example, Jeffrey Liker, a professor and consultant to GM since the 1980s, reported:

One of the GM managers was ordered, from a very senior level—(it) came from a vice president—to make a GM plant look like NUMMI. And he said, “I want you to go there with cameras and take a picture of every square inch. And whatever you take a picture of; I want it to look like that in our plant. There should be no excuse for why we’re different than NUMMI, why our quality is lower, why our productivity isn’t as high, because you’re going to copy everything you see. Immediately, this guy knew that was crazy. We can’t copy employee motivation; we can’t copy good relationships between the union and management. That’s not something you can copy, and you can’t even take a photograph of it

Fantastik!